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The Art of Offence: 
British Literary Censorship since 1970 
 
 
The 1960s are known as a decade of liberations. In any modern history of censorship 
and interdiction the period is important, as a time when numerous political and 
cultural forces undermined established attitudes and institutions. Those forces 
included black power and civil rights, especially in the United States; the student 
movement; the origins of modern Gay Liberation and of second-wave feminism. To 
them can be added the irreverent mood associated with the satire boom, 
emblematized by the BBC’s That Was The Week That Was and later Monty Python; and 
the unafraid energies of popular culture, notably the personae offered by the Beatles 
or Rolling Stones. Some of the actions of Harold Wilson’s Labour government from 
1964 to 1970 gave concrete legislative form to this atmosphere of liberalization. Roy 
Jenkins, as Home Secretary between 1965 and 1967 (and in a second spell from 1974 
to 1976), was probably the most liberal figure ever to hold the post. He was closely 
associated with several liberalizing measures, including bills for the legalization of 
abortion, the decriminalization of homosexuality, and the relaxation of legal criteria 
for divorce. In the tumultuous year of 1968, he also oversaw the abolition of the 
existing system of theatre censorship. The verdict of the Lord Chamberlain was 
replaced by a new Theatres Act, which in practice protected the stage from 
prosecution. 
Jenkins had also been the principal sponsor of the Parliamentary Bill which 
led to the Obscene Publications Act in the summer of 1959. This Act specified that 
material, ‘taken as a whole’, could be censored for demonstrating a tendency to 
‘deprave or corrupt’. (These terms derived from an 1868 case in which Chief Justice 
Cockburn defined obscenity as the ‘tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose 
minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of 
this sort may fall’ [Williams 1981: 9].) The new Act made provision for the police to 
confiscate materials suspected of being in this category. But it also officially aimed to 
‘provide for the protection of literature’. It allowed the defence of printed material 
for its coverall contribution to ‘the public good’. This includes ‘the interests of 
science, literature, art or learning, or of other objects of general concern’. In practice, 
it would allow numerous works, clearly ‘obscene’ in the sense of containing highly 
explicit sexual content, to be defended on the basis of their artistic merit. Such a 
defence could be significantly strengthened by the testimony of expert witnesses, 
including literary critics. The most spectacular instance was the parade of thirty-five 
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expert witnesses called by Penguin Books to defend its publication of D.H. 
Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1960. The unbanning of Lawrence’s novel was a 
watershed moment and the first major test of the new law. 
The 1959 Act, amended in 1964, was not the only one pertinent to the 
prosecution of published material. The legislation coexisted with the Customs Acts 
which allowed for material to be confiscated upon importation if it was considered 
‘indecent and obscene’, and with statutes providing the same basis for ‘prohibiting 
the transmission of certain material through the post and the display of material in 
public places’ (Williams 1981: 9). Other laws again would be opportunistically 
deployed by campaigners against alleged indecency. Nonetheless, in practice the Act 
amounted to a significant liberalizing move in the history of literary censorship in 
Britain. The last literary work to be successfully prosecuted under the Obscene 
Publications Act was Hubert Selby’s Last Exit to Brooklyn in 1968. The novel was 
banned as obscene by a jury, but then effectively cleared when this verdict was 
overturned for technical reasons, by a court of appeal in July 1968 (Sutherland 1982: 
71). 
 Between Roy Jenkins and Mick Jagger, the 1960s left behind an altered 
society. This essay commences at that point. Social attitudes had changed, or been 
challenged. Censorship had been relaxed, overturned, or made more difficult to 
achieve. Increasingly, a writer could publish descriptions of sexual activity without 
prosecution. Over the four decades after 1970, several other areas of liberalization 
would only increase. It would become uncontroversial to publish descriptions of 
gay, as well as straight, sexuality. Politicians would become viewed as fair game, in 
stand-up comedy or television satire for instance, along with other authority figures: 
priests, policemen, judges. This illustrates a decline of deference in public life. A 
decline in censorship has coexisted with a diminishing belief in the government’s 
right to tell people what they can and cannot do, or read. Accordingly, there are in 
fact few major examples of literary texts being banned in Britain since 1970. Theatre 
is a somewhat special case, as we shall see. And even poetry could provoke an 
occasional furore. But the banned novel would become an almost defunct category. 
Several novels discussed earlier in this book, like Ulysses and Lolita as well as those 
of Lawrence, have been uncontroversially canonized as modern classics. Their status 
is heightened by the belief that in bravely confronting excessively puritanical laws, 
they contributed to the growth of freedom.  
This tide of liberalization is the primary trajectory of the period. Yet counter-
currents and ironies are also discernable, as we shall see. They include the altered 
political climate associated with the New Right; the changing profile of religion and 
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ideas of blasphemy; the potential alliance between elements of political right and left 
over pornography. Overall, though, the period in question has witnessed a shift 
from censorship to offence. Explicit bans upon literature have virtually vanished. Yet 
public discourse about the offensiveness of creative expression has not ceased. 
 
The 1970s 
 ‘[F]or many politicized Britons’, asserts Andy Beckett, ‘the decade was not the 
hangover after the sixties; it was when the great sixties party actually got started’ 
(2009: 209). In a sense this applies also to the liberalization of print. Yet in the 1970s 
one can discern a backlash against the previous decade’s liberalizing motion. The 
early 1970s witnessed campaigns against obscenity, from members of the public and 
from figures in authority. These did not primarily affect literature, but they did 
threaten to change the law in ways that could have altered the climate for writers. 
Kenneth Tynan’s review Oh! Calcutta!, staged at Camden’s Roundhouse in 
1970, was not prosecuted despite its heavily sexual and scatological content. As the 
venue was in part subsidized by the Arts Council, many commentators were angry 
that taxpayers’ money was underwriting this display of obscenity. This mood was 
evidenced by the formation of the Festival of Light movement in 1971. That 
September, this movement against the permissive society staged large rallies in 
Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park. 
 The Obscene Publications Act and subsequent legal proceedings had cleared 
the way for literary works to be published with impunity. Yet prosecutions were 
brought against publications on other grounds. These included the charge of 
‘conspiracy to corrupt public morals’, under which the International Times was put 
out of business for its ‘contact ads’ in 1970 (Sutherland 1982: 104-5). The same charge 
was mounted against the counter-cultural magazine OZ the following year. The 
magazine was also charged under the 1953 Postal Act, as an indecent article sent by 
mail, and under the Obscene Publications Act itself. The longest obscenity trial to 
date in Britain, the OZ trial was the most prominent since the Chatterley proceedings. 
More explicitly than that case, it represented a confrontation between the 
establishment and a dissident milieu. The legal defence was led by John Mortimer, 
who handled most high-profile obscenity trials in the period. After a 27-day day 
trial, Judge Argyle found the magazine’s Australian proprietors guilty of publishing 
obscene articles and abusing the postal service. He handed down sentences of jail 
and deportation. The defendants’ long hair was shaved while they were remanded 
in custody. This seemed a gratuitously vengeful strike at counter-cultural style. The 
defendants were granted bail, however, and their appeal was heard in November 
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1971. As in the case of Last Exit to Brooklyn, a verdict which seemed to have changed 
the course of cultural history was rapidly enough overturned. Charges of obscenity 
were now rejected on the grounds that such material could have an emetic, rather 
than arousing effect. 
 The Labour peer Lord Longford was a Roman Catholic and a leading figure in 
the Festival of Light movement. In 1971 he set up a 50-strong committee which 
deliberated for 16 months and finally produced a 520-page report on pornography. 
The report was Longford’s own independent initiative rather than a government 
commission. It reflected his disquiet at the success of Oh! Calcutta! and at the spread 
of pornography more generally. It proposed new legislation, in which the ‘public 
good’ of the Obscene Publications Act would, crucially, be unavailable. Instead of 
the definition of obscenity, in practice since the Act of 1857, as having a tendency to 
deprave or corrupt, the new definition would be of material ‘whose effect, taken as a 
whole, is to outrage contemporary standards of decency or humanity accepted by 
the public at large’. This would be a more difficult criterion for a publisher to pass, 
and the abolition of a ‘public good’ test would make the prosecution of literary 
works more likely, returning the legal situation to its pre-Chatterley state. Longford’s 
report was debated at length in the House of Lords, but it was not to be taken up by 
the government as the basis of legislation. Rather it stood as the testimony of an 
alleged ‘silent majority’ who were unhappy with the recent tendency of 
liberalization, and in particular with the more extreme productions of the 
pornographic industry. 
In this it can be aligned with the Viewers and Listeners’ Association (VALA), 
founded in 1965 by Mary Whitehouse. The formidable campaigner Whitehouse was 
among the loudest spokespeople for a reaction against the liberalizing tide, 
especially in relation to broadcasting. During the 1970s she also sought to prosecute 
several publications. Her most conspicuous success in this regard concerned the 
fortnightly paper Gay News. In 1976 it featured James Kirkup’s lengthy poem ‘The 
Love That Dares To Speak Its Name’, with an illustration. The poem is narrated by a 
Roman soldier who takes the body of Jesus Christ down from the cross and manages 
to have sexual intercourse with it. The poem’s tone is sometimes solemn: 
 
So now I took off my uniform, and, naked, 
lay together with him in his desolation, 
caressing every shadow of his cooling flesh, 
hugging him and trying to warm him back to life. 
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It is also sometimes saucy, imagining a promiscuous Christ who ‘loved all men’ and 
seeking doubles entendres. The crucified messiah is ‘well hung’; the Roman soldier 
repeatedly ejaculates, ‘as if each coming was my last’. In its sometimes pious diction 
– the soldier remembers this sexual encounter as occurring ‘on that green hill far 
away’ – the poem resembles an Edwardian or Georgian elegy as much as anything 
fractiously counter-cultural. It is, in any case, a literary text. In this respect it gained a 
relatively rare distinction in being banned in Britain after 1970. Mary Whitehouse 
did not seek to suppress the poem under the Obscene Publications Act. That Act had 
already proved an insufficient basis in court to proscribe even Inside Linda Lovelace 
(1976), the plainly mercenary ghostwritten memoir of an American pornographic 
actress. Instead Whitehouse initiated a private prosecution for blasphemous libel, 
against Gay News and its editor Denis Lemon. 
This was an unexpected legal revival. The last imprisonment for blasphemy 
had been in 1921. A tacit presumption had settled that the charge was no longer an 
appropriate basis for prosecution. Lord Denning stated in 1949 that the blasphemy 
law was a ‘dead letter’. Religion was often enough the target of at least gentle satire. 
Mary Whitehouse’s redeployment of the law was thus a blast from the legal past. 
Defending Gay News in court, John Mortimer complained that it was ‘as if we had 
been whisked on some time machine back to the middle ages’. The judge 
nonetheless ruled that Kirkup’s poem was ‘the most scurrilous profanity’ 
(Sutherland 1982: 153-4). The jury followed his lead and agreed that the paper was 
guilty of blasphemous libel. So did the Law Lords on appeal. 
A new, old way had apparently been found to prohibit literature. Its 
subsequent effect would, in practice, be limited. In 2002 the gay rights campaigner 
Peter Tatchell led a public reading of Kirkup’s poem, challenging the authorities to 
prosecute. When they did not do so, Tatchell repeated – this time with more 
immediate basis – Denning’s claim that the blasphemy law was a dead letter. In 2005 
the group Christian Voice and the Christian Institute sought to obtain a ban on Jerry 
Springer: The Opera, but the case was dismissed on the grounds that the Theatres Act 
assured theatrical works the right of free expression. The offence of blasphemy was 
subsequently abolished in 2008, following the establishment of the Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006. This legal change reflected a social one, in which other 
religions than Christianity would also advertise their opposition to creative works. 
All this lay some way ahead when Mary Whitehouse won her singular victory over 
Gay News in July 1977. 
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The Williams Report 
The 1970s closed with a substantial, considered statement on obscenity and 
censorship. This was the Williams Report of 1979. In 1977 the Labour Home 
Secretary Merlyn Rees had tasked a committee to ‘review the laws concerning 
obscenity, indecency and violence in publications, displays and entertainments in 
England and Wales, except in the field of broadcasting, and to review the 
arrangements for film censorship in England and Wales; and to make 
recommendations’ (Williams 1981: 1). The committee was chaired by the 
professional philosopher Bernard Williams. He was a bold choice. An atheist and a 
liberal, he had also appeared as an expert witness for Last Exit to Brooklyn a decade 
earlier. Williams gathered a twelve-strong committee of experts, including the 
psychotherapist Anthony Storr and the feminist journalist Polly Toynbee. The 
committee reported in October 1979, with a ‘unanimity of conviction’ (Williams 
1981: ix). Williams’ report (for which in its 1981 reprint he claimed sole 
responsibility) applies a forensic intelligence to what he calls ‘the chaos of the 
present law’ (1981: 19). He finds inconsistencies and areas of incoherence, and 
records that ‘almost all of our witnesses’ wanted the ‘deprave or corrupt’ test of 1959 
to be abolished, possibly to be replaced by more readily usable terms. He notes an 
apparent contradiction, raised by numerous witnesses, in the 1959 Act’s implication 
that a work can ‘deprave and corrupt’ and yet be for the ‘public good’: ‘as though it 
could be for the public good that readers be depraved and corrupted, so long as it 
was by art’ (1981: 15). 
Williams also notes a change in practical legal norms: ‘experience in recent 
years has been of an astonishing contraction in the range of what juries determine to 
be obscene’ (1981: 11). One synoptic paragraph describing the situation since 1959 
makes plain what he considers ‘the retreat of the law from the written word’ (1981: 
35). After the earnestly argued cases of Lady Chatterley’s Lover and Last Exit to 
Brooklyn, Williams asserts, the 1976 acquittal of the flimsier Inside Linda Lovelace had 
announced a ‘further, perhaps final stage’. The police had opined to Williams’ 
committee that ‘the failure of that prosecution meant that the law was unlikely to be 
invoked again against the written word. Their view (which appeared from his 
summing-up to have been shared by the trial judge) was that it was difficult to 
imagine what written material would be regarded as obscene if that was not’ (1981: 
35). 
Williams’ report reflects on the balance of free expression and society’s need 
to check it, grounding itself in the liberal philosophy of John Stuart Mill (Williams 
1981: 53-6). The committee makes a ‘presumption in favour of freedom of 
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expression’ (57), and argues that the suppression of any written ideas in deference to 
contemporary mores may be an offence against the unknown future in which the 
free development of ideas could lead to altered values (56). From these profoundly 
liberal foundations, it accepts ‘harm’ as the major reason for prohibiting an item. 
Harms might be to the consumers of material themselves (for instance, people who 
would be degraded by excessive pornography), or they might be to others, causally 
resulting from obscene materials (for instance, the victims of sexual assaults which 
were encouraged or conditioned by pornography). Williams also envisages a 
generalized harm to the social environment – the ‘cultural pollution’ of generalized 
pornography, as was then visible in Soho (59) – though he expresses doubt about the 
exact nature of the harm in such cases. He describes the committee’s view that 
pornography should be seen an epiphenomenon of social change, more effect than 
cause: ‘to regard pornography as having a crucial or even a significant effect on 
essential social values’ is to get the problem ‘out of proportion’ (95). 
The committee ultimately proposes that existing laws on obscenity and 
pornography be torn up, and new legislation introduced to replace it. The existing 
concepts of obscenity, indecency and the purported ‘tendency to deprave or corrupt’ 
are all to be abandoned, in favour of the term ‘offensive’. The ‘public good defence’, 
such a signal element of the 1959 Act, is to be scrapped as unworkable, with the 
reassurance that material acting in the public good is unlikely to be found offensive 
anyway (126). Williams rejects the outright prohibition of all but the most extreme 
material, for instance that in the making of which minors are harmed. He proposes 
instead that existing obscenity laws be replaced by a thoroughgoing policy of 
‘restriction’. Thus pornographic material could not be exhibited in public or on the 
open shelves of a newsagent’s, but only sold behind the closed doors of specially 
marked premises. This satisfies twin requirements, on one hand to preserve the 
liberty of the individual consumer and on the other to preserve the freedom of the 
rest of the public from the affront of pornography as it goes about its business. In a 
summarizing formulation, Williams specifies that ‘Restrictions should apply to 
matter (other than the printed word) and to a performance whose unrestricted 
availability is offensive to reasonable people by reason of the manner in which it 
portrays, deals with or relates to violence, cruelty or horror, or sexual, faecal or 
urinary functions or genital organs’ (1981: 160). 
In the present context, the most significant element of this declaration is in the 
parenthesis: ‘other than the printed word’. Williams had determined that print 
should be excluded from censorship. The committee argues that the written word is 
qualitatively different from still pictures or film. Summarizing the rationale, 
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Williams writes that ‘The printed word should be neither restricted nor prohibited 
since its nature makes it neither immediately offensive nor capable of involving the 
harms we identify, and because of its importance in conveying ideas’ (160). Whereas 
a pornographic image can suddenly confront and offend the unwary pedestrian in a 
public place, written pornography requires dedicated perusal to have the same 
effect. It is thus far more easily avoided, and in effect is only active upon those who 
choose to engage with it. Hence it needs no special spatial restriction to prevent its 
being a public nuisance. In the Preface to the 1981 edition of his report Williams 
acknowledges that this element of the committee’s recommendations has ‘attracted 
misunderstanding’: ‘Some have concluded from this that we must suppose literature 
to have a less significant effect on people than photographs do’. Williams denies this. 
He clarifies again that the distinction pertains to ‘immediate involuntary offensiveness’: 
‘quite simply, to be offended by written material requires the activity of reading it’. 
He adds that there are no grounds for prohibiting print either, as the criterion for 
prohibition, harm to participants, ‘does not apply to written material at all’ (x). 
In the main body of the report, Williams also avers that besides speech, the 
written word is ‘the principal medium for the advocacy of opinions’. He makes it 
clear that whatever is to be considered offensive about pornography under the law, 
it is not its advocacy of any particular opinion, even the promotion of a ‘“swinging” 
life-style’ (100). A broader point is being made here about freedom of expression: 
 
Clearly some publications could have the effect of outraging or deeply 
upsetting many people because of the opinions or view of the world they 
advocated, which those who were outraged found deeply offensive to their 
own beliefs and outlook. However, many people would think that it would be 
contrary to basic principles of free expression even to restrict, let alone 
suppress, publications on this ground alone (as opposed, for instance, to 
controlling them on the ground that they incited to riot). (100) 
 
The Williams Committee was primarily concerned with sexuality, obscenity and 
pornography. Yet in subsequent years, debate over the right to publish would 
revolve at least as much around those matters of ‘opinion’ and ‘view of the world’ 
that Williams had understandably treated as irrelevant to his remit. In the meantime, 
his committee had issued in a document remarkable for its lucidity and sober 
liberalism. If enacted, the report’s recommendations would formally decriminalize 
the written word altogether. 
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Artificial Storms 
The Williams Report, unlike Lord Longford’s, had been commissioned by 
government. Yet like Longford’s it did not directly produce new legislation. A 
probable factor in this outcome was a change of government. In May 1979 Margaret 
Thatcher was elected as Prime Minister of a new Conservative administration. She 
remained in post until November 1990. The political climate apparent as the 1980s 
commenced was not hospitable to the values that Roy Jenkins had promoted for the 
previous two decades. Faced with urban riots in 1981, Thatcher herself explicitly laid 
blame at Jenkins’ door and rejected his claim that the ‘permissive society’ was the 
‘civilized society’ (Campbell 2003: 115). Yet this did not mean, in practice, that the 
recent tide of decensorship would be rolled back. The decade’s most celebrated case 
of prohibition was the government’s unsuccessful attempted to suppress Spycatcher, 
a memoir by the former MI5 operative Peter Wright. If anything, the case 
demonstrated that political controversy, rather than obscenity, was now the likeliest 
spur to censorship. 
The 1980s did produce one significant piece of legislation on the prohibition 
of published material. This was Clause 28, later Section 28, of the Local Government 
Act 1988. The Act’s sponsors objected to what they viewed as the indulgence of gay 
and lesbian rights by local authorities. In particular, they wished to prohibit the 
presence in schools of children’s books which appeared to present gay and lesbian 
relationships as healthy and acceptable. On these grounds, Susanne Bösche’s Jenny 
Lives with Eric and Martin, translated from Danish in 1983, joined Spycatcher on the 
decade’s roll of controversy. No prosecution was brought under Section 28, prior to 
its repeal by a Labour government in 2003. (Repeal came first in Scotland in 2000: 
this campaign was more controversial, thanks in part to a businessman who loudly 
funded a campaign to retain the law.) Its major achievement, by its sponsors’ lights, 
was probably increased self-censorship on the part of nervous local authorities. But 
its largest consequence was unintended: to galvanize the gay community and its 
liberal supporters into renewed political activism. Section 28 demonstrated the 
sexual illiberalism of much of the Conservative Party at the time; indeed the party 
continued to support the law into the twenty-first century. But its ultimate repeal 
arguably illustrates the overall trend towards liberalization in British society, at least 
regarding sexuality and its cultural representation. 
The last major legal battle to prohibit a particular literary work for its sexual 
content had been fought early in the 1980s. In autumn 1980 Howard Brenton’s play 
The Romans in Britain was staged at the National Theatre in London, directed by 
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Michael Bogdanov. The play juxtaposes scenes from three different periods: a 
Roman invasion in 54 BC, the post-imperial chaos of 515 AD, and British troops in 
Northern Ireland in 1980. These periods overlap on stage. Broadly, the play appears 
hostile to empire, whether Roman or British, but its scope militates against the 
extraction of too simple a moral. 
 What shaped the play’s fate was a scene in which a Roman soldier attempts 
the anal rape of a young, male Celt. The action is accompanied by the Romans’ 
casual, brutally lighthearted banter, rendered in modern idiom. The Daily Telegraph’s 
reviewer averred that if the Romans ‘specialise in the rape of naked young men’, 
likewise ‘the play specialises in the rape of our senses’ (Freshwater 2009: 97). The 
Festival of Light urged the Charity Commission to reconsider the National Theatre’s 
charitable status. The mysterious ‘South London Action Group’ disrupted a 
performance by pelting eggs, flour and even fireworks at the stage (Boon 1991: 174). 
The far-right National Front protested outside the theatre. The Daily Mirror 
contacted Sir Horace Cutler, Conservative leader of the Greater London Council and 
member of the National Theatre board, to provoke a reaction. The belatedly alerted 
Cutler sent a public telegram to the National’s artistic director Peter Hall warning 
that the National’s state subsidy would suffer for this outrage. It did: in March 1981 
the theatre’s GLC grant was frozen, amounting to a cut. 
 The most serious challenge to Brenton’s play came through legal channels. 
Mary Whitehouse never saw the play, but was informed that was indecent. She 
persuaded Scotland Yard’s Obscene Publications Squad to examine the production, 
and unsuccessfully urged the Attorney General to prosecute those responsible. In 
earlier cases she had demonstrated her ingenuity in finding unsuspected legal 
avenues of attack. Now she found another. The 1968 Theatres Act appeared to 
guarantee the freedom of the stage. But owing to a small loophole in that Act, the 
play might be found guilty of the crime of gross indecency, under the Sexual 
Offences Act of 1956. Michael Bogdanov, as director, was accused of ‘procuring’ the 
indecency between the two actors involved in the Roman’s attempted rape. In effect, 
the onstage scene was being treated as equivalent to a sexual encounter in a public 
convenience. As Richard Boon comments, ‘the case turned on the question of 
whether the simulation of an act of gross indecency was itself an act of gross 
indecency’ (1991: 176). 
It is worth emphasizing the difference here between the play’s status and that 
of prose fiction. Plainly, much fiction had been decried and, before the period 
covered by this essay, banned, for its ‘simulation’ of sexual acts – not just rape like 
that shown by Brenton, but consensual sexual intercourse in general. In the historical 
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period we are now considering, however, the representation of such acts in writing 
was no longer legally deemed an offence, even if it might offend sensibilities. The 
theatre differed from the novel in containing, not just verbal representations of 
actions, but actual, flesh and blood bodies. The Romans case hinged on the idea that 
the corporeal simulation of an act was a qualitatively different kind of representation 
from its depiction in print. Theatre’s deployment of human bodies remained an 
avenue of attack for those keen to censor. The printed word, innately distinct from 
its object of representation, had now apparently passed beyond their jurisdiction. 
The Romans case went to trial at the Old Bailey in March 1982. The play’s 
defence was led by Lord Jeremy Hutchinson, who had contributed to the defence of 
Lady Chatterley’s Lover in 1960. Justice Staughton rejected Hutchinson’s submissions 
that the Sexual Offences Act was not applicable to the simulated behaviour of the 
theatre stage. This ruling was the trial’s most decisive outcome. In principle, it 
appeared to mean that this play and others could legitimately be prosecuted for 
indecent display, or indeed other offences, in future. The protection of the Theatres 
Act was punctured. 
 At this point, the prosecution team requested an adjournment. The 
prosecuting counsel Ian Kennedy informed the defence that he did not wish to 
pursue the case. The Attorney General was obliged to enter the verdict of nolle 
prosequi, an unwillingness to proscute. The trial’s dénouement remains mysterious. 
John Sutherland, writing in 1982 (188), suggested that the ‘canny’ Whitehouse was 
content to have made her point – and hence to have left a Sword of Damocles 
hanging over British theatre. Geoffrey Robertson of the defence team would claim 
that Hutchinson had dismantled Ross-Cornes’ credibility, and that the trial’s 
discontinuation was the retreat of a defeated foe. Contrastingly, Mark Lawson (2005) 
speculates that Kennedy suffered a crisis of conscience, realizing that the defendant 
could be jailed on what was a spurious charge. Whatever the motives involved, the 
trial’s outcome was nobody’s resounding victory. 
 Brenton’s play was taken to court for its ‘indecent’ depiction of an act of 
sexual violence. But for many commentators, the sense lingers that other things were 
more tacitly at stake. Richard Boon has offered a full expression of this view, 
proposing that the play was a useful occasion ‘for a number of figures, inside and 
outside government, who wished both to test and to reinforce the new “moral 
climate” of the early eighties’. Its sexual content and obscene language were 
presented as evidence of the decline in moral standards since the 1960s. Its 
scepticism about nationalism and heritage contradicted Thatcherism’s keenness for 
them. Its treatment of British military involvement in Ireland, Boon adds, ‘lay behind 
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and fuelled much of the criticism it received’. Finally, its controversial occupation of 
the National Theatre, and specifically of its main stage, facilitated the complaint that 
state sponsorship should be withheld from such ‘scandalous’ artistic work: a view 
readily in keeping with Conservative scepticism about arts funding (Boon 1991: 209). 
 This view of the play’s compound political offence would be echoed in 
relation to another controversy centring on another genre. Tony Harrison published 
his long poem v. in 1985. It tells of the poet’s visit to the Leeds cemetery where his 
parents are buried. Vandals have sprayed graffiti, some obscene, on the graves. 
Harrison argues with an imagined skinhead, an alter ego, and the poem’s texture 
becomes heavy with swearing. Overall, though, it laments this coarsened cultural 
world, which is also the fractious era of the miners’ strike: the poem yearns for the 
unity forged in the Second World War. v. became controversial in 1987, when 
Channel Four televised a reading of it. Newspapers like the Sun and Daily Mail 
stoked expectations of ‘FOUR-LETTER TV POEM FURY’ (Harrison 1989: 40-1). 
Several Conservative MPs tabled a motion stating that ‘the stream of obscenities 
contained in the poem is profoundly offensive and will serve to hasten the decline of 
broadcasting standards’: they called on the Independent Broadcasting Authority to 
‘instruct Channel 4 not to broadcast the poem’ (60). Numerous columnists piled in to 
attack or defend the poem, as the broadcast went ahead. In 1989 Bloodaxe reprinted 
the poem with facsimiles of this debate appended. Like Penguin’s 1961 volume of 
the Chatterley proceedings, the publication was simultaneously historical archive, 
vindicatory gesture and marketing move. 
 Harrison credibly reckoned it ‘an artificially created storm’ (43). The 
publication of the poem by Bloodaxe, and indeed the London Review of Books, had not 
been controversial. What stirred dispute was v.’s televisation – accompanied by its 
republication in the Independent newspaper. Several commentators made this point. 
Exemplary was Ronald Butt, a relentless campaigner against obscenity, who 
reasoned in The Times that ‘the minority who buy and read the poem are unlikely to 
have their language or their spirit corrupted by it. However, it was another matter 
when it was decided that Mr Harrison should read it on Channel 4 late at night and 
that it should go into people’s homes’ (55). He likewise castigated Bernard Levin (an 
eloquent advocate for Harrison as he had been for Brenton) for quoting the poem in 
the newspaper: ‘families’ would be ‘faced with obscenity on the breakfast table’ (55). 
John Sutherland (1982), surveying censorship’s history, repeatedly stresses the 
distinction between expensive hardbacks or small-press productions, and mass-
market paperbacks. What sometimes passes untroubled in the former class becomes 
explosive in the latter. Offence, it seems, is not only about a text’s content, but its 
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practical availability and cultural visibility. In v.’s case, television clearly plays the 
cheap paperback’s role. By 1987 obscenity in literature was unproblematic. But 
televised literature remained another matter. 
 Blake Morrison, introducing the poem in the Independent, asserted that in such 
controversies ‘the true source of dispute differs from the stated one’. The Romans in 
Britain, he adjudged, had offended not for ‘nudity and buggery’ but for its 
‘contentious history’. Likewise, the real shock of v. was its bleak portrait of ‘a 
divided society’ (Harrison 1989: 56). An equivalent case might be made for the 
Scottish socialist James Kelman’s how late it was how late (1994), whose Booker Prize 
win provoked yet another four-letter-word furore. The novel tells the story of an 
impoverished, persecuted Glaswegian, Sammy, in a third-person narrative which 
permits itself ready access to his rhythms of thought. A sentence like the following is 
quite typical: 
 
No if it was the worst ye had, if it was the worst; cause it was fucking 
happening and it wasnay a nightmare it was right fucking now, right fucking 
now so okay, okay, ye still had to relax, ye still had to take it easy, okay, ye 
had to get it under control, it wasnay a time for cracking up, we’ve all cracked 
up, we know what fucking cracking up means, this wasnay a time for it, 
know what I’m saying, this wasnay a time for it, so there’s nay fucking 
problem ye just let it go, let it go. (Kelman 1994: 44) 
 
We notice a number of features. The sentence is about ‘cracking up’, the mental 
stress of poverty and disenfranchisement. It rolls ahead, unconcerned with elegance 
or a quick ending: it depicts the monologue with which the protagonist talks himself 
into continuity and survival. The English is idiomatic – ‘ye’, ‘wasnay’: this is a 
deliberately localized language, forged in phonetic defiance of Standard English and 
in attempted solidarity with the Scottish subject (Kelman 1992: 82). It is in this 
context that we read the repeated word ‘fucking’. Clearly, the word’s literal 
association with sex is long discarded here. It is serving as an intensifier, 
emphasizing a quality – ‘right fucking now’. It also serves as a way of registering the 
character’s incredulity or annoyance, distancing himself from a position: ‘nay 
fucking problem’. Blake Morrison (1994) reckoned that ‘fuck’ appeared four 
thousand times in the book, and mischievously deduced that ‘the word appears on 
average a mere ten times a page’. The word is too prevalent to retain the force we 
might associate with it in other contexts, where it can convey great anger or threat, 
and provoke shock. Rather, for Kelman’s character it has become like a piece of 
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punctuation, an item of semantic furniture so standard that a paragraph without it 
might look suspiciously bereft. 
 Some were unsettled or annoyed by the acclaim given to Kelman. The Booker 
judge Rabbi Julia Neuberger distanced herself from the award, hardly raising the 
tone in declaring the novel ‘crap’. The journalist Simon Jenkins more colourfully 
dubbed the novel ‘literary vandalism’ and likened Kelman to an ‘illiterate savage’ 
(Jordison 2011). Kelman himself used the award ceremony as the occasion for a 
protest about the suppression of ‘indigenous’ language from outside London. This is 
one more case, therefore, of a controversy over obscenity which opened on to 
broader social and aesthetic divides. The novelist A.L. Kennedy has opined that ‘A 
lot of the reviews that complained about the language were actually complaining 
about the type of people who were being portrayed because they weren’t the type of 
people who would be allowed in a “nice” novel. [...] The problem with Kelman was 
never that he said “Fuck”, it was that he wrote about the wrong kind of people’ 
(Dale 2002: 24). Kennedy’s case may be overstated. By the end of the twentieth 
century, the notion of an exclusively ‘nice’ novel with which the London 
Establishment is repressing literary expression seems something of a straw target. 
But Kelman stands as an extreme case of writing that treats ‘obscene’ words as a 
regular, indispensable part of the rhythm of thought and speech, to the point where 
whatever was supposed to be obscene about the word becomes hard to recall. 
 
‘Liberal Censorship’ and Literary Obscenity 
Within Western democracies, censorship has often been associated with the illiberal 
intuitions of the political Right. But during the period in question here, debates on 
the value of censorship also proliferated across the Left. Some debated, for instance, 
whether material alleged to be racist should be available in school libraries. Probably 
the longest-standing site of what Peter Barry (1992: 233) calls ‘liberal censorship’, 
and John Sutherland (1982: 191) ‘the censorship of Enlightenment’, is feminism. In 
urging economic and political equality for women, the movement has also 
frequently complained at the representation of women (and indeed men) in the 
media, advertising and the arts. Feminists have alleged that reactionary depictions of 
women, fictional as they may be, affect real-world perceptions, and hence damage 
the cause of equality and justice between the sexes. Probably the extreme case of this 
complaint is pornography. It is commonly alleged that pornography presents a 
demeaning vision of women, which may affect the perceptions of those who 
encounter it. It is sometimes further alleged that pornography has helped to fuel 
male sexual assault. A feminist slogan of the 1970s puts it pithily: ‘Pornography is 
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the theory, rape is the practice’ (Morgan 1977). It is difficult to prove relations of 
causality between such representations and individual actions. Those who do so ally 
themselves, in this respect, with Mary Whitehouse, who claimed to be prosecuting 
The Romans in Britain because it would provoke men to assault young boys. A 
conservative and Christian movement for censorship and a radical movement for 
sexual equality would seem strange bedfellows. Many feminists have been 
accordingly wary of making a case for censorship, even of material that they 
deplore. Distrustful of puritanism, the maverick feminist Angela Carter promoted 
the benefits of erotic art and envisaged the Marquis de Sade as a model for sexual 
relations. An extensive theoretical literature developed around the debate (Cornell 
2000). 
 Whatever their view of pornography proper, most feminists would be still 
more reluctant to call for the prohibition of literary works on these grounds. Yet the 
two areas may be seen to overlap. Literature’s indulgence of a male sexual 
imagination can be presented as reason to question it, if not to ban it. A 
consideration of three male writers can illustrate this. 
 Alasdair Gray’s 1982 Janine is the monologue of a middle-aged Scot, Jock 
McLeish, who routinely distracts himself with extensive pornographic fantasies. 
These improvise elaborate descriptions of women’s clothes and bodies: ‘the white 
silk shirt shaped by the way it hangs from her etcetera I mean BREASTS, silk shirt 
not quite reaching the thick harness-leather belt which is not holding up the 
miniskirt but hangs in the loops round the waistband of the white suede miniskirt 
supported by her hips and unbuttoned as high as the top of the black fishnet 
stockings whose mesh is wide enough to insert three fingers’ (1985: 18). Perhaps 
more disturbingly, McLeish’s fantasies also tend towards sadism and the violent 
punishment of his female characters. The first half of the book is dominated by this 
material. McLeish imagines an ‘orgasm race’ featuring ‘hordes of waitresses in tight 
red satin slinky button-through dresses’ which ‘must come before the last and 
biggest gangbang which will leave me completely exhausted and unconscious’ (119). 
The novel’s depictions of sex and the erotic are not occasional but obsessive. The 
book is about a pornographic imagination, and it accordingly, unabashedly becomes 
almost identical with pornography itself. 
 There can be little doubt that this novel would have contravened the law on 
the printed word prior to 1959. Even at a much later date, its sexual obsessiveness is 
remarkable. Yet the work as a whole is far more complex than the summary above 
suggests. It ultimately shows McLeish’s pornographic mentality to be symptomatic 
of his failures in life, even of a whole political era. Steeped in pornography, the novel 
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is also a critique of a society in which pornography is so prevalent. With 
extraordinary determination, Gray’s book does everything that had been deplored 
both by traditional morality and by the feminist critique of pornography – while also 
exemplifying and endorsing that very critique. McLeish comes to understand that 
his fantasy of female entrapment is a projection from his own fearful existence: ‘The 
woman is corrupted into enjoying her bondage and trapping others into it. I did not 
notice that this was the story of my own life. I avoided doing so by insisting on the 
femaleness of the main character. [...] My fantasies keep reliving that moment of 
torture for Janine because I have never fully faced it in my own life’ (194). 
 Adam Mars-Jones saw the radicalism of Gray’s work. His 1990 pamphlet 
Venus Envy is a critique of the insidious sexual politics that Mars-Jones perceived in 
the apparently progressive work of Martin Amis and Ian McEwan. He contrasted 
them both with Gray. 1982 Janine, notes Mars-Jones, ‘concentrates almost exclusively 
on the disreputable’ in modern masculinity: 
 
Alasdair Gray chooses as his subject the part of the male psyche that is almost 
by definition the most distorted and destructive, and finds in it, safely 
encoded, a simple message that has been scrambled everywhere else by the 
high-minded censors of consciousness. A profound truth has survived by 
allying itself with the strong unexamined current of sex, and has only been 
recovered by a willingness to start from the most unprepossessing materials 
(1997: 153, 155). 
 
In the present context, 1982 Janine takes on a remarkable, exemplary role. For it is a 
peculiarly clear example of what the Obscene Publications Act defends: a textbook 
case of an obscene work with a high moral agenda. The ‘public good’ defence of its 
publication would be easily articulated – and would coincide closely with the 
feminist critique that has attacked the effects of pornography during the period 
covered by this chapter. 
 Even so, pornography cannot necessarily be contained so cleanly. Gray 
himself, asked about the book’s use of sexual fantasy for a critique of masculinity, 
has blithely admitted: ‘Oh it does a bit, aye, but the thing is, I quite enjoyed writing 
the sadistic nasty bits’ (Boyd 1991: 113). S.J. Boyd cites this remark and worries about 
the sexual content of Gray’s work. He allows 1982 Janine its justification, but in 
Gray’s later novel Something Leather he finds a more plainly reactionary – indeed 
‘outrageous and dangerous’ – pornography (122). Boyd does not, of course, call for 
the later novel to be banned. He is doubtless aware that the legal instruments to do 
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so no longer effectively exist. In any case, he would value Gray’s artistic freedom of 
expression over his own political or aesthetic disagreement with the work. Here is 
the place of the erotically charged work of fiction by the 1990s: its politics and effects 
might be questioned or decried, but this has no implication for its right to exist and 
readers’ right to experience it. 
The same principles apply, more extensively, to Martin Amis. Far more than 
Alasdair Gray, Amis has earned a degree of public notoriety for his treatment of sex 
and gender relations (Dyer 1989: 62). His novel Money (1984) reflects explicitly on the 
pornographic industry. Its protagonist makes sexually suggestive TV commercials in 
Soho and consumes pornographic magazines extensively. In a 1984 interview Amis 
was asked about the pornographic element of his fiction. ‘There are certainly one or 
two pornographic scenes in Money’, he remarked. This looks like an interesting 
reclassification: one that a writer prior to 1959 could hardly have made. Opening the 
novel, one can readily encounter the kind of material Amis might have had in mind. 
Within the first few pages his narrator John Self has walked into a New York bar and 
started watching strippers: 
 
there writhed a six-foot Mex with wraparound mouth, hot greasy breasts, and 
a furrow of black hair on her belly which crept like a trail of gunpowder into 
the sharp white holster of her pants. Now this is a bit more fucking like it, I 
thought. In my experience you can tell pretty well all you need to know about 
a woman by the amount of time, thought and money she puts into her pants. 
[...] And these pants spelt true sack knowhow. She danced like a wet dream, 
vicious and inane. [...] The face, the body, the movement, all quite secure in 
their performance, their art, their pornography. (Amis 1984: 8) 
 
Money does not depict an especially large amount of actual sexual intercourse. But 
sexuality, desire, and specifically the kind of pornographic imagination instanced 
here are pervasive through the novel. From the start, the reader is confronted with a 
realm of strip joints, pornographic magazines and male entitlement (albeit coupled 
with male doubt and insecurity) which may well be uncomfortably unfamiliar. We 
watch Self in bedroom encounters with his partner, who relays sexual fantasies to 
him while wearing ‘an extended black bodice that clasped between her thighs, and 
chrome stockings, and golden shoes’ (73). Later he tells us of a session auditioning 
young actresses who are all asked to undress: a ‘sun-bleached, snowblind vigil of 
booze and lies and pornography’, in which the girls ‘took most of their clothes off 
and gave you a lesson in their personal anatomy’ (197-8). Self is ultimately undone 
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during two scenes in which he is tempted by the ‘pornographic’ sex that he 
considers his natural element (346, 369). 
Money is incendiary, to the point of illegality, by the older canons of taste that 
prevailed prior to the Obscene Publications Act. Yet the book’s fascination with the 
pornographic does not necessarily make it a member of that category itself. Amis, in 
the interview quoted above, immediately resists the assimilation of his work to the 
category of pornography: ‘It’s very easy for me to decide that I don’t write 
pornography, because I’m sure that one of the definitions of pornography would 
have to be that the creator of pornography is excited by it, and I’m not excited by 
anything except by how I’m going to arrange the words’ (Tredell 2000: 64). With this 
radical, even implausible aestheticization Amis steps away from the identification of 
his own work with pornography, and enshrines it once more as pure verbal art. 
Amis knows, though, that pornography is no harmless, uncontroversial 
matter, even after a decade and more of decensorship. He even explicitly concedes 
that ‘the feminists have got a very strong argument against pornography’, 
apparently on the grounds that ‘it’s just a nasty way of making money for all the 
people who are in it’ (Tredell 2000: 64). As Kaye Mitchell (2012) has shown, Money 
emerged in a period when feminist debates around pornography were at their 
height. The novel takes on board this brand of the ‘censorship of Enlightenment’. 
John Self looks in a bookstore window at ‘the most recent scrotum-tightener from 
the feminist front’: Not On Our Lives, by Karen Krankwinkl, maintains that ‘all 
lovemaking was rape, even when it didn’t seem that way to either of the 
participants’ (136). This is a satirical version of the radical feminism of Andrea 
Dworkin, a leading voice on the branch of feminism that wished to ban 
pornography. The novel depicts that campaign more explicitly in a British context, 
when Self is looking at pornographic magazines in a local newsagent’s, and finds the 
magazine torn from his grasp by ‘A plump, pretty girl with a sensible scarf, two 
badges on the lapel of her corduroy overcoat, her face and stance vibrant, 
unflinching, exalted’ (158). The feminist demands ‘Why aren’t you ashamed of 
yourself?’ and ‘How can you look at those things?’. Self’s responses are disarmingly 
candid, admitting to his own shame and putting up no case in his defence. The novel 
is thus peculiarly self-conscious about the issues of gender and exploitation: 
wallowing in pornography, it also gives voice to a characteristic contemporary 
opponent of pornography. Yet the feminist does not quite go unanswered. The novel 
also features a character called Martin Amis, avatar of its author, who meets John 
Self in a cafe soon afterwards. A witness to the scene in the newsagent’s, Amis tells 
Self ‘“I thought you handled yourself pretty well, considering”’, and suggests that 
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‘“you could have argued that the man [in the pornographic magazine] was being 
exploited too”’ (176-7). Characteristically, Amis seeks not so much to deny feminism 
as to incorporate and outbid it: precisely the manoeuvre that Adam Mars-Jones 
(1997: 128-56) would find so recurrent in his work. 
 The author of Money plainly understood what was considered offensive, and 
headed straight for it. Feminists have recorded their offence at Amis’s work, notably 
for its two-dimensional depiction of women. When Amis’s novel London Fields (1989) 
failed to appear on the Booker Prize shortlist, others took umbrage on his behalf. 
Jane Ellison wrote that the book had been disqualified for its ‘sleazy, nasty sex’ (a 
claim denied by a Booker judge), and defended it by asserting that it was women 
writers who were primarily responsible for ‘trashy, lurid blockbusters’ full of 
‘pornographic sex’ (Tredell 2000: 97-9). Clearly the intersection of literature, 
pornography and misogyny was a site for critical argument at the end of the 1980s. 
Yet the debate necessarily remains in the realm of offence – or even, less emotively, of 
disagreement about the view of women suggested by Amis’s fiction – rather than of 
censorship. Amis’s critics might yearn for a period of silence from him, but none has 
called for his work to be banned for its proximity to pornography. The work is 
clearly self-conscious about the contested area into which it cheerfully intervenes: to 
the point where a feminist critic can cautiously state that ‘in his fictional and non-
fictional treatments of pornography, Amis might be seen as adding to and extending 
our understanding of it’ (Mitchell 2012: 93). 
A third example from the period shows how literature, decades after the 
Chatterley trial, could still provoke real anger and controversy. Philip Larkin died in 
1985, but his profile rose again in 1992-3 when a volume of letters and biography 
were published. Some readers were shocked at what was revealed. In his private 
letters, many spiced with swear words, Larkin had (often with self-amusing irony) 
expressed views far to the political Right and casually disparaged black and Asian 
people. The poet Tom Paulin (1992a) commented that the racist letters’ ‘obscenity’ 
(by which he seemed to mean ‘moral enormity’) ‘simply adds to the ever-increasing 
barrage of racial abuse which persons of colour presently endure in this society – 
arguably it lends credence to such prejudice and to the increasing number of racial 
attacks in Britain’. The literary academic Lisa Jardine (1992) stated with satisfaction: 
‘Actually, we don’t tend to teach Larkin much now in my Department of English. 
The Little Englandism he celebrates sits uneasily within our revised curriculum, 
which seeks to give all of our students, regardless of background, race or creed, a 
voice within British culture’. The poems might be worth studying to discover ‘the 
parochial beliefs which lie behind them’, but could not be defended as ‘humane’ 
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when ‘the student who consults the selected Larkin letters in the college library 
confronts a steady stream of casual obscenity, throwaway derogatory remarks about 
women, and arrogant disdain for those of different skin colour or nationality’. The 
veteran critic John Bayley (1993) disagreed with what he regarded as a new 
‘establishment’’s view ‘that poetry is politics, and that Larkin’s is now shown to be 
fundamentally out of order – “English” therefore bad’. Larkin’s friend Maeve 
Brennan likewise dismissed ‘political correctness’ and opined that Larkin himself 
would have commented, ‘with at least a two-finger gesture’, ‘that this was 
censorship of the most vicious kind which violated the principles of freedom of 
speech’ (2002: 112). 
This controversy over Larkin’s political views does not relate primarily to 
obscenity in itself. But as Joseph Bristow notes, the swear words to which few had 
objected in Larkin’s published poetry somehow became freshly offensive in the 
letters, amid attacks on Pakistanis and trade unionists. Jardine implies that Larkin’s 
‘steady stream of casual obscenity’ is innately offensive. But a like stream could be 
found in many of James Joyce’s letters, not to mention the work that commenced the 
era of decensorship, Lady Chatterley’s Lover. Bristow’s reading in fact echoes Boon’s 
and Morrison’s view that controversies over ‘obscenity’ reflect other concerns. ‘[I]t is 
hardly the case’, he reasons, ‘that “fuck”, “crap” and “piss” have suddenly turned 
into outmoded words in English poetry. It is rather that the letters went on sale at a 
time of immense political turmoil that enabled us to understand, much to our 
frustration, how Larkin’s four-letter words issued from a conservatism that the 
nation had increasingly come to despise’ (Bristow 1994: 160). The claim about ‘the 
nation’ looks ambitious. But Bristow is plausible in arguing for the compound nature 
of Larkin’s offence. Obscenity alone may be tolerable. But when combined with 
other politically objectionable material, it has an additional inflammatory effect. 
The Larkin case was a notable practical instance of disputes over the politics 
of writing, contemporaneous with the ‘culture wars’ in the United States (Bérubé 
1994). One anonymous librarian declared that Larkin should be banned from library 
shelves, but others at the Library Association’s Record rejected the call (‘D.S.’ 1993). 
Larkin had once, famously, mentioned ‘the end of the Chatterley ban’ in a poem. 
There was no prospect of Larkin’s work being prohibited from sale as Lawrence’s 
had been. The strongest conceivable outcome of his perceived offence was to be 
removed from a particular syllabus. More mildly and more commonly, his work 
would continue to be studied, but in a context that emphasized its political 
hinterland as a negative dimension. That seemed the implication of Paulin’s 
complaint (1992a) that the letters had in fact been too censored already by their 
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editor Anthony Thwaite. Instead they should be published unexpurgated, with an 
Introduction that ‘sought to place, analyse and understand – socially and 
psychologically – Larkin’s racism, misogyny and quasi-fascist views’, because ‘We 
need to understand the culture that produced these monstrous hatreds’. This is a 
long way from censorship. In a sense it is the opposite: ‘Let us have the missing 
[possibly racist] passages in print’, Paulin repeated the following month (1992b). Yet 
it still suggests a form of culpatory special treatment. The implicit assumption 
appears to be that the work, if not carefully neutralized by contextual critique, could 
be harmful. In this respect the leftist response to work it deems objectionable retains 
something of the model that had long been present in censorship debates. Literature 
might not ‘deprave’, but without critical care it might still ‘corrupt’. 
 
The Rushdie Affair 
When the Williams Report hypothesized a public protest that could cause offence, it 
imagined the scene ‘[if] someone burns an IRA symbol or a photograph of the 
Ayaytollah Khomeini’ (1981: 101). In 1979 the latter was a topical reference. A central 
figure in the Iranian Revolution that installed an Islamic regime, by the end of the 
year he held the position of ‘Supreme Leader’. Williams could hardly have guessed 
that Khomeini, rather than any pornographer or student radical, would trigger the 
most extensive and intense debate over literary censorship in Britain in the next 
three decades. 
 In autumn 1988, Muslims began to protest against Salman Rushdie’s new 
novel The Satanic Verses. In India and Pakistan they gathered to burn the book and 
denounce Rushdie. Religious leaders encouraged them. The protests spread to 
England, notably to towns with sizeable Muslim populations. British Muslims 
demanded that the government ban the book. In December 1988 a large crowd in 
Bolton attended its first British burning. It is unlikely that all the protesters had 
finished reading Rushdie’s long, digressive novel. They nonetheless claimed to be 
offended by his depiction of their religion’s founder, Mohammed. The controversy 
peaked on Valentine’s Day 1989 when the Ayatollah Khomeini pronounced a fatwa 
on Rushdie. Every Muslim, he declared, was obliged to join a quest to hunt and kill 
Rushdie and others responsible for the book. Iranian organizations offered a bounty 
for the writer’s murder. Rushdie went into hiding, protected by the Special Branch. 
For several years he surfaced only to make occasional appearances and 
pronouncements on his plight. The novel’s paperback was delayed for three years as 
publishers feared violent reprisals. Bookshops stocking the novel were bombed in 
Britain and the United States. Some shops ceased to stock the book or kept it hidden 
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under the counter. The novel’s Japanese translator was murdered in 1991. Others 
would die or be seriously injured in connection with the fatwa. In 1998 the Iranian 
government, manoeuvring politically as it re-established diplomatic relations with 
Britain, declared that it would no longer seek Rushdie’s assassination. It maintained, 
though, that the fatwa technically still stood as only the now dead Khomeini had the 
power to lift it. Various elements in Iran have subsequently reaffirmed the fatwa. 
The Satanic Verses has remained available in Britain. The state did not censor 
Rushdie but protected him. Yet this remains a major episode in the history of literary 
censorship, distinct in several ways. First, it involved various degrees of unofficial or 
de facto suppression: booksellers prudently declining to display the novel, readers 
being careful not to display it in public, the actual burning of large quantities of the 
book. It thus demonstrates that not all censorship need be legally sanctioned. 
Second, the affair was unusual in the levels of violence it involved, actually or 
potentially. These included riots, bombs and murders, as well as the mortal threat to 
Rushdie. Mary Whitehouse was not an interlocutor to relish, and Michael 
Bogdanov’s cast cannot have enjoyed the missiles thrown at them by the South 
London Action Group. But these forms of opposition still look mild next to the 
violence of Rushdie’s detractors. Third, the basis of the objection was not sex but 
religion. This marked a major shift. While British society continued to liberalize its 
norms of sexual representation and display, it now appeared that in another respect, 
freedom could be curtailed once more. Fourth, the case is unusual in very evidently 
involving ethnic difference. It was by definition a dispute within a multicultural 
society, in which different traditions and beliefs were now present. The objection to 
Rushdie was not framed in terms of ‘contemporary standards of decency’, or the 
‘reasonable person’ hypothesized by the Williams Report. It could not claim the 
consensual basis that Mary Whitehouse – correctly or not – claimed for her own 
campaigns. It represented the voice of one particular ethnic and religious group, 
which in global terms was very large but in British terms was a minority population, 
primarily made up of relatively recent generations of immigrants. Within British 
society, the objection to Rushdie must appear as the pleading of a special interest, 
rather than (as many other objections, like Lord Longford’s, have claimed to be) a 
case made behalf of the broad mass of British people. Indeed, it should be added that 
the case against Rushdie was not necessarily accepted by all Muslims, in Britain or 
elsewhere. One should be wary of assuming the homogeneity of such a group, and 
mistaking the claims of often unelected ‘community leaders’ for the views of many 
others who happen to belong to the same ethnic group but whose voices are not 
heard. 
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 The Rushdie affair provoked much commentary, notably from novelists. It 
reminded writers of the precariousness of their freedom. Many wrote in support of 
Rushdie, in public letters and petitions. At the annually televised Booker Prize 
ceremony, winners paid tribute to their persecuted colleague. Arguably, all this was 
a salutary effect of the affair. The controversy clarified for many writers and critics 
the value and vulnerability of freedom of expression, and the virtue – and attendant 
danger – of defending it. The critique of censorship gained a new energy and 
urgency. Some of what was written was, if anything, over-elaborate. Writers 
expounded on literariness and its relation to ‘sacred’ discourse (Sammells 1992: 12). 
Our modern notion of literariness, with its paradoxical blend of verisimilitude and 
non-referentiality, is indeed interesting. Yet it is not strictly important to the defence 
of Salman Rushdie. To claim that it is is to imply that if Rushdie had written a non-
fictional work, the Ayatollah’s death sentence upon him might have justified. This 
would be false. What was at issue was simpler than such lucubrations suggested: the 
freedom of a British subject to live and work in safety.  
 Subsequent events have occasionally echoed the Rushdie affair. In late 2004 
Gurpreet Kaur Bhatti’s play Behzti was staged at Birmingham’s Repertory Theatre. 
The play shows sexual abuse and murder taking place in a Sikh temple. It was 
picketed by Sikhs angry at what they claimed was a desecration. The protests 
continued during the play’s run, culminating in a riot in which the theatre was 
attacked and the 800-strong audience evacuated. The play was then withdrawn, 
while the playwright received death threats. In the media, another stand-off took 
place between religious protesters and secular voices claiming freedom of expression 
(Freshwater 2009). In 2005, a Danish newspaper published a set of cartoons depicting 
the Islamic prophet Mohammed. Over the next five years, Muslim reaction to this 
publication would include the bombing of embassies and a violent attack on one 
cartoonist. In 2010 an American pastor attracted publicity for announcing plans to 
burn the Quran on the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. 
These last two examples take us beyond both Britain and literature proper. 
But they contributed to a sense that the most explosive offence today relates to 
religion, rather than concerns about obscenity which now seem all but extinguished 
in the United Kingdom. In Britain the emphasis on religion as basic to one’s identity 
was encouraged by the Christian Prime Minister Tony Blair, who promoted ‘faith 
schools’ where children would be taught by clerics. The Racial and Religious Hatred 
Act 2006 conformed to this climate, in its implication that religion should be given 
special protection. The Act amends the Public Order Act 1986. It specifies that it is an 
offence to speak, write, publish, perform or broadcast with the intention of ‘stirring 
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up religious and racial hatred’. The legislation was controversial, especially as prior 
to amendment it proposed to make an offence of ‘threatening, insulting and abusive’ 
language in relation to race or religion. Writers, comedians and civil liberties 
campaigners, including the National Secular Society and English PEN, recognized 
that the banning of ‘insult’ to religion was profoundly illiberal and retrogressive, 
though partially typical of the religiosity favoured by the Prime Minister. The bill 
was amended on its passage through Parliament, and in its final form the legislation 
specified both that offences must be ‘threatening’ (mere abuse and insult were no 
long proscribed) and that the effects of threat or hatred must be intentional. This 
appears to lessen the legislation’s capacity to diminish legitimate free speech in the 
name of religion. 
 
The State of Censorship and the Nature of Offence 
The censorship of printed literature for obscenity was considered to be a 
discontinued policy, for practical purposes, by the end of the 1970s. The Williams 
Report recommended its official abolition. While that report was not enacted, the 
prohibition of books on such grounds appears to be a thing of the past. Obscenity in 
drama retains an unresolved status since the inconclusive outcome of the Romans in 
Britain trial. The potential for prosecution under the Sexual Offences Act, or indeed 
another statute, has in principle hung over the theatre ever since. This is one major 
reason why Brenton’s play has only rarely been revived. Any future attempt to 
prosecute a dramatic production on such grounds would have to contend with 
cultural climate. Thirty years after the Romans trial, suggestive postures verging on 
simulated sexual acts have been commonplace on mainstream television (for 
instance in comedy panel shows: Shooting Stars, They Think It’s All Over and their 
successors). The general prevalence of such bawdy would affect the judgement of a 
jury and make prosecution less likely. The point is general. The cultural and media 
climate in Britain in the early twenty-first century is arguably more sexually explicit 
than at any other time considered in this volume. The prohibition of any literary 
work on sexual grounds is correspondingly less probable, absent a radical change in 
ideological climate. 
 Religion, however, has re-emerged as a ground on which censorship might 
justify itself. Since the Satanic Verses furore, the idea has gained traction that a work 
could offend on religious grounds and might therefore merit restriction: either to 
protect the sensibilities of those who claim to be offended, or on the more 
pragmatically prudent grounds that the text’s circulation increases the likelihood of 
social disorder. The case of Behzti shows that similar pressures can apply to the 
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theatre. As Mark Lawson (2005: 10) puts it: ‘at least in theatrical terms, God is the 
new sex’. In terms of the history of censorship, this is arguably a surprising 
development. It threatens to reverse the long-established direction of travel toward 
greater liberalization. 
 In the course of this essay we have observed a tendency for the legal 
prohibition of ‘obscenity’ to be replaced by the looser, usually less official fact of 
‘offence’. Had Lord Longford’s Quixotic campaign succeeded, ‘to outrage 
contemporary standards of decency’ would be ground for prosecution. As it is, 
simply to offend is not generally a legal matter – however culturally explosive it may 
be in the realm of instant publication, reaction and debate furnished by the internet. 
If offence were a crime, most of Martin Amis’s work would be proscribed. It is 
apparent, though, that the revival of religious anger and complaint, of which the 
Rushdie affair is the archetype, means that giving offence can be a serious matter. De 
facto censorship may occur; public order and the safety of the author may be 
jeopardized by the cultivation of offence by religious groups. Against this, Bernard 
Williams would have recalled us to the insistence of his lodestar, John Stuart Mill, 
that to be offended by another’s opinion or expression may be regrettable, but is not 
grounds for censorship in a free society. 
 This robust line has been taken by two of the most intelligent recent 
commentators on the question of offence. Stefan Collini, in a polemical book on the 
subject, outlines the peculiar character of offence, as an emotionally subjective matter 
that nonetheless tends to lay claim to broader standards of agreement. Even though 
it appears that ‘if someone does not feel offended, then they have not been offended’, 
offence normally also involves ‘some element of conviction that such a reaction is 
legitimate or justified. [...] [It] is not simply on account of some odd quirk or 
susceptibility of our own that we find ourselves offended’ (2010: 11-12). Collini notes 
that questions of criticism and offence have lately acquired ‘a new complexity and a 
new urgency’, because of the tendency for ‘offended’ persons to speak on behalf of 
the underprivileged or minorities. Liberals, Collini perceives, are torn between 
‘treating all other people with equal respect’, and giving special dispensation to 
those who can claim to be victims of ‘existing disadvantages’ (2010: 6). Yet he insists 
that criticism must not restrain itself simply because another party may claim to be 
offended: ‘in those societies where relatively free public discussion is not just 
permitted by is protected by law, we should resist any temptation to equate offence 
with harm. [...] Offending someone’s beliefs, no matter how central they think those 
beliefs are to their identity, does not constitute the kind of harm the law can rightly 
be used to prevent’ (54-5). 
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 Steven Connor takes a still stronger line against the emotive claims of the 
offended. At present, he says in a brief piece from 2008, it seems that ‘Artists and 
writers, and those who transmit their work, like producers, publishers and 
broadcasters, must maintain a constant state of vigilance with regard to the 
possibility of causing offence.’ Yet Connor has little trust in the term. He finds its use 
suspiciously  incoherent – why do we talk of ‘hurting someone’s feelings’, rather 
than just of hurting them? He even finds offence itself implausible, to the point of 
non-existence, declaring: 
 
I honestly don’t know what being offended is meant to feel like, in the way 
that I’m sure I know what it feels like to be angry, humiliated, jealous, sad, 
envious or fearful. What’s more, and no offence, but I actually mean that I 
don’t know what it feels like for anyone to be offended, and I don’t think they 
do either. [...] [O]ffence is always a vicarious feeling, which is felt, or claimed 
on behalf of some other putatively injured party. Being offended is therefore 
not something you feel, but something you do: it’s a demand, a claim to 
entitlement and, of course, reparation. 
 
Collini seeks to put offence in its place, and weigh the rights of criticism against it. 
Connor virtually denies all validity to the category of offence. He seems to deem it a 
phantom feeling: not a genuine emotional basis for action, but a fiction concocted in 
order to further one’s own manoeuvres for authority. His case is extreme, and 
provocative – though like Collini he makes the plausible point that offence is very 
often taken (and Connor insists on the active sense in which this must be done) on 
behalf of others who may not have felt or expressed any offence themselves. This 
much was surely true of the clerics who first stirred protest against The Satanic 
Verses. We need not necessarily endorse Connor’s bracing, thoroughgoing scepticism 
about offence. Yet we can concur with Collini’s liberal view that the claim of offence, 
where actual harm is not threatened, should not be allowed to outweigh the freedom 
to inquire and criticize. 
 A last complexity merits remark. The official prosecution and banning of a 
work may be the most thoroughgoing way to limit the circulation of ideas and 
expression. But subtle limits can also result from the structures of cultural 
production. The field of expression, and of what is available to audiences, can be 
limited not just by proscription but by neglect, or by a cultural economy in which 
certain forms and possibilities are made unviable. A cultural economy run by 
oligarchs and corporations with profit margins uppermost may not engage in actual 
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censorship. But it may in effect offer a very limited range of cultural expression. In 
the British context, one can try to imagine what the effects would be if the BBC were 
abruptly abolished and the entire Arts Council grant withdrawn. These moves 
would not appear as ‘censorship’ as it is usually understood. But they would 
probably limit the range of cultural expression available to British society far more 
heavily than any prohibition of a particular text. 
Arguably, freedom of public artistic expression depends not only on the 
absence of state censorship but also on a structure of cultural production and 
dissemination that actively protects diversity, and offers exposure to art that is not 
produced primarily for commercial ends. The Williams Report itself made this point, 
in differing from Mill’s belief in a free market of ideas: ‘falsehood indeed may 
prevail, if powerful agencies can gain an undue hold on the market’. ‘Intervention’, 
Williams concluded, was justified: ‘it can take the form of such things as state 
subventions for the arts, or policies of refusing to design television programmes 
solely on the basis of ratings, or subsidising institutions of critical enquiry’ (1981: 55). 
The absence of such policies can restrict diversity. We could thus say that 
censorship, in practice, can be a ‘sin of omission’ as well a determined activity. All 
this is pertinent to British society at the end of the period surveyed by this book. 
That is because the spread of neo-liberal values as political norms, within and 
without Britain, has threatened the future of institutions like the BBC, or indeed 
public higher education, which help to underwrite a mixed cultural economy and to 
promote diversity. The ‘censorship’ that matters most in Britain in the decades to 
come may be the limitation unwittingly imposed by the market. 
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